

In the Name of the Nato

A Simple Essay on the Role, Influence and Perspective of the Alliance in the XXI Century¹

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Introduction:

Are Crisis and Hyperactivity a natural couple?

In the last years, it seems to be a consolidated trend to read from important journals and reviews, link to world politics issues, that the word "Nato" implies itself an "antique category" or maybe an "old and ineffective mechanism of the Cold War". Even if NATO's adaptation, after the end of the Cold War was positive, spreading security and stability through enlargement to new members in Central Europe and applying force to impose peace agreements in Bosnia and Kosovo, some of the most valuable politicians and theorist describe NATO as a sort of sick octopus which tentacles have been losing influence since the Berlin Wall collapsed in 1991.

After the 11-S, the mentioned trend tends to regain force and NATO seems to face something of an existential crisis. These people simply highlight, making a *grotesque comparison*, between the genetic goal (established in the Treaty of Washington 1949³) of the Alliance and the current inexistence of a visible enemy to deter, strike or contain. The slogan works like a global alarm clock: "If the red ghost has been defeated, it's time to wake up because NATO could be an Alliance but...against who?".

This conception/perception on NATO, that considers the security alliance as an old reminiscence of the Cold War, is supported by a large number of exponents. The tricky point is that they will never affirm that NATO must disappear but they

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³ Article 5 defines the essential clause of the Alliance, the collective defence: "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such armed attack occurs, each of them.. will assist the Party or Parties... including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area"

just attack the functionality and inefficiency of their multidisciplinary tasks. In this way, they undermine the real and potential influence that the Alliance could achieve in the next decade. In fact, there is a clear example in the statements that belongs to the former Prime Minister of Spain: *"NATO is in a real and very deep crisis, despite its hyperactivity. Do you think that it is natural and acceptable for any politician in Europe to go to the public and argue for the multi-deployment of NATO in far away places, while people are being blown apart in trains and buses on European soil?"*⁴.

This kind of questions are based on the political complexity that implies explaining to regular citizens how NATO's role and influence is vital for our lives than it used to be amid tension cycles of the Cold War or, which is the same, the first phases of the balance of terror. Days after the Cuban Missiles Crisis in 1962, it was easier to understand *who* was the enemy and *why* member of NATO had to be united. After 11-S, the problem came out because many politicians have faced rhetoric and pragmatic complications to persuade their nationals/electorate on *how and in which grade* NATO contributes to regain national security (reinforcing indirectly regional stability) leading the ISAF in Afghanistan, operating with naval forces in the Mediterranean, developing training mission in Iraq, providing humanitarian relief after Katrina and Pakistan natural disasters or generating a new sphere of peace in the Balkans. General Joseph Ralston does not hesitate to point out this transition towards the new security environment and the challenge that represents for the Alliance; claiming what follows:

"For most of NATO's history the strategic problem was easily defined: we could predict where might fight and under what conditions. Our adversary was clearly defined and we could fairly accurately describe his strategy, his tactics and his military capabilities. And the strategy worked. NATO played the pivotal role in defeating the Cold War threats. (..) But today we do not know who the enemy might be, the security environment we face is much less certain. It is characterised by unpredictable threats and asymmetric

⁴*NATO should focus on counter-terrorism, former Spanish leader say" Jose Maria Aznar Statements November 30th 2005, in "Euroobserver.com".*

***strategies that are likely to allow little time for
mobilisation”⁵***

The key point that inspired this short essay is part of the contradiction that leads sceptics to affirm that NATO is out of order. Crisis and hyperactivity are not natural partners. By definition, it is difficult to engage an organization in a broad range of activities whilst is trying to cope with a genetic crisis. NATO is alive because there is no other organization that are engaged in multidisciplinary fields as NATO does. That is a fact. NATO is alive because it has moved from a rather static approach to security that was suitable in the past to a much more active and functional approach. This includes to be prepared to react well away from its traditional areas of operations; a strong determination to develop the necessary military means to be able to take action; an effort to develop partnerships with other nations such as Russia and Ukraine and the enhancement of NATO's vital space as a forum of political dialogue. Who can deny these facts?

Goals and Structure

The paper aims to demonstrate that the present relevance and future potential of a stronger NATO for the international security system, in the current century, is unique and desirable for the entire Atlantic community and the re stabilization of the whole international order.

In reference to the anatomy of the paper, it starts with a comprehensive theoretical framework. In fact, it would not be serious to enumerate a long list of threats and mixed them with the potential specific weight of future powers (as China or India) to conclude with original scenarios. Moreover, there are certain elements that the current international system has been developing that should be defined and recognized to identify the role and challenges of the Alliance.

Secondly, the paper focuses on the primary role that NATO has carried out (*a must* to be reinforced) which links the transatlantic disparities in two critical areas: military capabilities and the on-going securitization process. Later, the second role that NATO should consider more seriously associated with China's peaceful emergence and its regional stabilization. To conclude, the final reflections

⁵ Joseph Ralston, *Keeping NATO's Military Edge Intact in the 21st Century, Presentation to the NATO/GMFUS Brussels Conference, October 3rd, 2002*, available <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003d.htm>.

are based on five areas to be revised in order to reinforce the Alliance as the cornerstone of the Global security affairs.

Refreshing the concept of a new security system: Securitization, Backyards and Soft Power

The heart of the paper is fully supported by the following analytical pillars:

The core idea of our analysis defends the rejection of the traditionalist paradigm that restricts security to one sector⁶ arguing, in turn, that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. The core idea of security in the XXI security tends to support the regional security complex theory⁷ (Buzan 1991) and the dynamics of security, above all, in the process of securitization of three sectors: military, political and economical⁸. *The first theoretic pillar has to do with the centrality of a wider agenda of security and the respective process of securitization.* Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politization. Buzan explains clearly the basics on the concept, when he outlines:

“In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures

⁶ The traditionalist approach has been considered the first theory based on state centric security complex and the obsession for military menaces in large scales due to the realism paradigm and speculations emanated during the atomic nuclear race in the Cold War.

⁷ B. Buzan, O. Weaver and J. Wilde: *Security: A New Framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. London (1998).

⁸ Sectors are defined as specific types of interaction. The military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production and finance.

***and justifying actions outside the normal bounds
of political procedure). ”⁹***

Secondly, *the second pillar to understand the security affairs in the next years is closely associated with regions and proximity rather to intercontinental-missiles-attack speculations and red phones. In this sense, security becomes more abstract than it used to be because it refers to perceptions and the potential juxtaposition of interests in the backyards of the current regional powers.* In fact, there are many elements in this international-system-under-construction that shows us clearly the juxtaposition of spheres of influence between the growing backyards of three powerful players: US, China and the European Union. The essay framework firmly defends *the potential securitization of similar issues in specific and delicate geographical areas* that could restrain the intrinsic weak balance of the system. (*ex. The re- militarization of Japan is a sensible issue that could face the US policy in relation to Peking reactions or the approach of Ukraine and Moldova towards the EU accession process could lead to a political dispute between the US and the EU, not to mention Moscow collateral effects.*)

The third systemic feature is the gravity of the geopolitical revolution that is setting up new dialectics in the globe divided by the famous nation state units¹⁰. As a consequence, internationalist may wonder: Which is the protagonist unit in the XXI century? Is integration a new step to continental states or states will remain the main unit which will lead the international affairs?. There is no space to answer these questions but to explain that *NATO is and should reinforce itself as a subsystem regime*. In fact, a subsystem can be distinguished from the entire system by *a particular nature, the intensity of their interactions with each component of the subsystem and a cohesive criteria that determines the evolution in long terms*. NATO is unique in nature and composition as it has been representing the ideological bridge of the west for 55 years. NATO's interaction has grown significantly through the enlargement towards the East (including the famous treaty with Russia in 2002) and the multiplication of new tasks and missions after 1991. Finally, NATO has been protecting basics on democracy (sometimes forget it) that killed 60 million human life in the WWII: cooperation

⁹ B.Buzan, O. Weaver and J. Wilde: *Security: A New Framework for analysis*. Page 24. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. London (1998).

¹⁰Dialectics refers to the Giulio Amato concept linked to Balkanization / Enlargement of the EU that could be reflect in other regimes or organizations such as the UN, WTO, NATO, etc. See G.Amato: *Noi in Bilico. Inquietudine e Speranze di un Cittadino Europeo. Intervista a cura di Fabrizio Forquet*. Editoria Laterza. Roma 2005. (*Italian Version*)

between nations¹¹, freedom between citizenship and systemic stability. Contrary or not to this conception, it sounds difficult not to establish in the following lines that NATO is a determinant international subsystem with autonomous influence.¹²

The fourth pattern that describes the international security system is more specific: the nascent revolution in military affairs that is transforming the entire way the United States' approach and organization for future wars. This tremendous change includes various aspects and patterns: massive US defence spending, the introduction of advanced technologies and revolutions in the communications and information industries. Indeed, it does not have to do only with money and technology but how a country organizes, thinks and trains for warfare.

The fact is that the US military services are making dramatic strides in changing the way to fight. They are shifting from attrition based force-on-force warfare to effects-based operations; from force-oriented to capability-oriented approaches to military planning; from terrain-based to time-based; and from segmented land, sea and air services to shared coordination across all military services (joint forces). As Hamilton has recently outlined when he explains the "transformationist" American approach :

"Americans are focusing more on asymmetric threats. They are focusing on smart weapons, space based systems, and C4 I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) capabilities that can be used to synchronize and leverage the capabilities of the entire force, and technologies and practices that can save manpower and increase lethality and survivability. Unfortunately, most Europeans governments do not perceive the same magnitude of new threats or imagine themselves fighting the

¹¹ Cooperation between nations is maybe the strongest positive contribution of NATO last years. The Alliance took action in response to a number of natural disasters (including Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Pakistan) which has led to the largest relief operation that NATO has ever undertaken. Not to mention the assistance to the African Union with its peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

¹² In this context, defining NATO as subsystemic regime implies that the alliance might arguing against the view that security is just war and force or that another issue are relevant only if they relate to war and force. Unfortunately, the risk is that expanding interest in non-military or the well known *non article five operations* could take the whole Alliance to a serious intelectual and political incoherence.

***kind of wars that are driving US innovation.
Therefore, adapting their military forces to ensure
they could win those wars is not a priority***¹³

*Finally, there is a strong element that is gaining influence in international politics analysis: soft power and linkage politics as a couple. The Soft Power defined by Joseph Nye Jr. works as an umbrella, controlling confidence between actors and reinforcing popular legitimacy of a diplomatic consensus, whilst linkage politics lies in the formula of exchanging certain short terms benefits for a long term political engagement. Negotiations and potential escalation of crisis (until the use of force) are depending on these abstract but real elements of the international security architecture. There are many examples emerging from this transition*¹⁴.

NATO's primary role: Reshaping the West

US to become a smart power or the EU a credible military partner?

NATO depends on what US and EU want to do together. If they do not define its commitment and patterns of security cooperation, NATO will pay for it. ESDP and NATO-EU / US cooperation are not marginal technical issues. They are emblematic of a central debate: how and whether Europe and the United States can align the grand experiment of European integration with a strategic shift of the transatlantic partnership to tackle together the challenges posed by post-9/11 world.

Moreover, the geographic figure of the west that shaped the Cold War does not exist anymore but an on going mutation of a restyled west. Although the whole western geopolitics figure are damaging certain multilateral mechanisms (such as UN and WTO), NATO not only survived to this structural threat but has become once again an open model of the transatlantic cooperation that are deploying and re styling itself to spread the influence that used to have in security affairs. The difference remains in the field of complexity and perception of this contribution.

¹³ Daniel Hamilton, *American perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy*. Danish Institute for International Studies 2004. *The Politics of European Security* (Edited by Jess Pilegaard- Copenhagen 2004)

¹⁴ Negotiations of Germany, France and UK with Iran to stop the nuclear weapons project includes commercial, financial and military fields); The EU is leading the process (accumulation of Soft Power) even if the United States of America continues to be the single market model for Europeans clearly reflected on the Lisbon Strategy revised by the EU Commission (2005).

A) Military capabilities gap: the EU without sticks;

The EU will not convince anyone in Washington that they are serious about the ESDP (which could compliment NATO forces and mission) unless the military capabilities begin to adequate to the new security environment. In fact, this is a controversial problem that indirectly undermines the credibility and soft power of the European Union as a influential global player. Three items should be revised: a-1) *Static Defense Budgets*¹⁵ that consolidate a double-level disparity: Four countries concentrate almost the 75% of the EU defense spending –UK and France (45%) and Germany and Italy (30%)-. On the other hand, European spending on military power is half that of the US, Americans spend close to six times what EU nations spend of military R&D (representing alone more than the entire Germany's defense budget)¹⁶; a-2) *Inadequate spending and savings on equipment*, to push pooled operations to save money and improve interoperability among armies; harmonizing activity cycles and trainings (Taking the leading case Franco-British summit 2003 with aircrafts carriers); a-3) *Fragmentation of the European defense market*, the six main European arms-producing countries signed the so called Letter of Intent in 1998 to harmonize some of their armaments regulation, but it has not yet had impact at all.

Naturally, negative effects of this gap is also reflected in NATO's real capabilities: for example, the US provides 100% of NATO's standoff jamming capability, 90% of the air-to-ground surveillance and reconnaissance, and almost 80% of the air refueling tankers necessary to conduct operations. Nonetheless, *NATO has been the framework that provides initiatives* to tackle this negative asymmetry. In 1999, members of the Alliance agreed on a program, a list of 58 priorities called the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), to focus European procurement efforts on particular needs. By 2002, the relative success of the DCI was refreshed by a new program called The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The PCC, a list of eight requirements, focuses on critical areas such as a secure communications, precisions-guided weapons, air and sea transport, and air

¹⁵ Twenty five European Union countries spend roughly 175 Billion Euros collectively on defence, which is not a insignificant amount of money. In fact, the EU's is the biggest defence spender after the US. However the EU spends about half what the US spends on defence but the Europeans do not get near half of US military capability (Keohane, 2004). Moreover, without new equipment, European soldiers might not even make it to the battlefield. To illustrate, European troops needed US planes to take them to Macedonia in 2001 because most of European armies do not have adequate transport capabilities.

¹⁶ US spending per active duty service member is almost four times that of Europe's and there are gaps in the cost-effectiveness of spending (although EU spends about the half what the US spends, they get less than 50% return in terms of capability).

to air refueling. Fewer and more precise that the earlier DCI, the Prague commitment have a greater chance of being implemented, reducing gradually the military gap and spreading a multilateral mechanism of reciprocal cooperation¹⁷. Moreover, since the beginning of 2002 the EU has its own procurement programme, the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) which like NATO Prague programme, aims to focus European efforts on acquiring practical crucial assets. *The EU's equipment goals compliment NATO's in most areas except for network-centric warfare capabilities. Officials involved in ECAP process claim in 120 out of 144 specified gaps have been filled.* In fact two ideas were introduced: framework nation and interims arrangements (to fill capabilities gaps if there are scheduled to arrive only years later). The reciprocity and interdependence between NATO structure and nascent European ESDP is significantly and necessary.

B) Securitization process in contrast: US losing its carrots

Substance, style and better presentations of foreign policy are dividing member of the Alliance. The reasons could be found through this scheme: who securitizes, which object and consequently, which policy is implemented.

The United States of America elaborates the NSC (September 2002) by which securitizes international terrorism (associated to Weapons of Mass Destruction and failing states) as the main threat¹⁸ of American civilization and values.¹⁹ International Terrorism suits perfectly with our definition because *the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure* such as a new important legislative body²⁰, a huge increase in the defence budget and the reorganization of the Army as well as the public agencies to undermine the threat.

¹⁷ NATO countries finally agreed to develop a fleet airborne ground surveillance aircraft, on the model of the AWACS early-warning fleet that NATO already has. These aircrafts, like all the other new capabilities, would be available for either NATO or EU missions

¹⁸ These threats were the only issue that agreed G.W.Bush and J.F.Kerry during the presidential debates before the elections in November 2005.

¹⁹ See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss2.html> (Chapter II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity): "In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. (...) America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property"

²⁰ The US House of Representatives has introduced "urgently" the following acts: the Public Safety and Cyber Security Act of 2001, the Patriot Act (2001), the Uniting and Strengthening America Act (2001) and the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act (2001).

Although 11 September terrorist strikes in the US, the transatlantic framework that had created Madeleine Albright during Clinton's administration known by the "three D's", has remained intact during the Bush administration, creating "confusion" between partners of the Alliance.²¹

The European Union as a bloc did not have an 11-S attack. Neither Madrid nor London terrorist bombings are comparable to the collapse of the Twin Towers in the US. Indeed, for a long time Europeans' experience with terrorism are linked to the form of car bombs and booby-trapped trash cans. Terrorism is not seen as an occasion for war but as a crime problem. Europeans authorities are far from launching a *US style preventive war on terrorism* and mobilizing the military corps, establishing detention centers and redesigning administrative bureaucracy regarding the terror field. In turn, the EU Commission Lisbon Strategy revision (2005) has securitized the European sustainable growth by which the social model, pension coverage and employment remains the main referent objects to defend. Terrorism does not represent a substantial threat but a problem that could emerge through growing flows of illegal immigration and the consequent fissure of the formula liberalism and multiculturalism societal integration.

The key point of the complex transatlantic figure is that the US is losing credibility and influence to engage allies and thus set international terrorism as the top issue of the global agenda. By contrary, the EU have emerged as a focal bridge of soft power that lacks of domestic appetite and military capability to go further in large scale interventions. Hence, NATO is suffering from this contrast of priorities which are dismantling the core values which used to keep the members of the Alliance together in the Cold War. Therefore, it is imperative to understand and separate two points: 1) NATO could not only reduce the transatlantic military gap but also ensure a permanent forum where common analysis of threats are discussed (as Angela Merkel proposed) 2) Modifications or radical change of doctrines of foreign policy and its societal consensus about the importance of large scale wars or peacekeeping operations, are duties that belong to governments; not to NATO decision making sphere.

²¹ Clinton Administration's support was conditioned by what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright termed the 'three D's': no *discrimination* against non-EU NATO members, no *decoupling* of European and North American security, and no *duplication* of NATO's operational planning system or its command structure. 'No duplication' was never defined, nor was it ever intended to mean that the EU should not develop certain capabilities that already existed in the Alliance.

NATO's second role: Helping (containing?) China to get integrated in the International System

In the coming years, China's weight and resources, that will allow its government to strengthen its military power, will significantly increase. In fact, the problem emerges when China's integration into a global order that by definition fosters stability and predictability, on the basis of law and common norms, is by no means assured. It is not clear whether China will accept in its foreign engagements, legal and procedural disciplines that does not yet accept in its inner agencies and embryonic democracy. So, the main question that regards to NATO medium-terms goals is what follows: Will China integration (as a consolidated power) *contribute* to a global legal order, or it will *act as a destabilizer*, taking advantage on the discontent of all those who are not satisfied with the status quo?

Since 11-S, a number of Chinese security officers have come to realize that their country has already benefited from its commitment to the international campaign against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China clearly securitizes Taiwan's independence claim (Anti secession Law) and continental separatist forces (the Turkestan Islamic Movement is classified as terrorist cell) as it can be seen in the 2005 biannual Defence White Paper. Moreover, foreign policy is completely based on defending geo strategic positions (connected to energy supplies maritime-areas) that are slowly presenting China's economy as the *black hole of the global energy regime* (by which the US and EU have been deploying their growth strategies). Not to mention the hypothesis that implies Taiwan Straits as the pivotal phase of hard power projection in the region. If so, there will be crescent tensions between regional poles, such as Japan and India, and consequently US-China extended backyards in the Pacific.

A former US Deputy Secretary of State suggested in November 2002 that in the wake of NATO enlargement and the successful Partnership for Peace programme, it was time that NATO planners turned their attention towards relations with China. In fact, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Secretary General of the Nato) has admitted that the Alliance's core tasks (antiterrorism, regional stability and non proliferation) suits Peking's interests.

Although these shared-tasks, that could allow the transatlantic Alliance to integrate China's vital interest, there is no perspective of deeper interaction but a

transparent dialogue. No form of Partnership will be possible to match Japan and China interest within the Alliance. The dialogue partnership established by NATO and Japan and the existence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization *per se* are real obstacles that decision makers and politicians cannot deny. NATO has taken a decision that covers values, new threats and a geographic constitution. The strategic cooperation between China and NATO has a long story that starts with the informal cooperation against the URSS. This historical fact shows how NATO could engage itself to support and help China to stabilize the region or, by contrary, contain dangerous trends of power.

Final Remarks: A New Doctrine for a New Order

The final reflections are based on the core idea of the analysis. Although military capabilities gaps, crescent asymmetric threats and lack of credibility on UN security collective mechanism, NATO have moved towards a flexible approach showing an important success. This transformation has begun with the *Prague Agenda 2002* which focused on reducing the capabilities gap between Members; it followed by reinforcing the common funding and the defence planning thanks to the *Norfolk Agenda* (2004) and, in response to the Iraq Crisis, the *Munich Agenda* (2005) aimed to create a transatlantic space for strategic consultation and decision making. In other words, many international events pushed NATO to adapt its structure to cope with: non traditional threats emerged from societal developments rather than from governmental decisions, enlargement to the East, United Nations Security Council crisis, natural disasters and international terrorism.

Today, the challenge tends to be bigger than expected. A formal counter terrorism strategy of the transatlantic community does not exist. The emergence of China and India, that is shaping a new region of potential delicate military issues, seems to be out of NATO agenda. The United Nations' reform (especially the Security Council one) is being considered separate from NATO strategic long term goals and procedures. Briefly, NATO is becoming a global actor that must go further the non article V operations (as it does) but it also has to create an identity (common brand) among Members accompanied by a new doctrine to face the XXI century threats.

According to this diagnosis, a new doctrine should serve the Alliance as the main *doctrinal framework* to match and enforce the triple Agenda proposals (Prague, Norfolk and Munich). The pillars will have to define clearly the

instruments, the rules of cooperation and the purpose of the Alliance. In any case, the doctrine not only should combine elements of continuity and radical reforms but has to take into account five specific areas:

1. *US- EU working together against terror*: By adapting the triple "D" doctrine, a common position about the menace that implies terrorism and WMD threat, for the transatlantic values, must be reached. By securitizing areas and objects in the national field, the US are losing the consistence as a democratic power and the EU as an effective global player. The Alliance should foster the harmonization of their positions in order to promote a *transatlantic engagement* that pushes towards a clear definition of the *types of threats* that suppose a terrorist menace for the entire community. Briefly, NATO is ready to enhance and compliment ESPD and the new paper of the NSC on homeland and national security doctrine of the US on behalf of the Alliance;
2. *Enlargement*: the doctrine should include a projection of the Alliance new membership for 2025 (including menaces and mechanism of cooperation with non members) elaborating a *Declaration on NATO Common Values* that would refresh the bloc's identity²²;
3. *Consultation*: the Alliance may function as a genuine partnership in the pre-conflict strategic decision making phases, which is the same: it must be prepared to generate a real debate between Members and so, addressing a sort of annual agenda;
4. *NATO-UN compatibility*: The effectiveness of the on going reform process of the UN is important to NATO's transformation. In fact, the future shape of the Security Council could not be incompatible to the new doctrine of the Alliance due to legitimacy reasons of the EU Allies. Both institutional reforms are the only capable of restoring the centrality of International Law in the global arena;
5. *Military Capabilities and Crisis Management Operations*: As commented previously, NATO has been playing a major role regarding the growth

²² China and India are relevant actors of Asia but gradually they will become regional superpowers. The doctrine cannot skip this new pattern and must focus on how to cooperate more accurately in this region and which are the diplomatic tools to achieve it.

of European Allies' military capabilities.²³ This policy should be supported and reinforced in order to accelerate the transformation and balance between Members capabilities. Furthermore, the ESPD could be implemented with a large domestic consensus in case of projecting and concentrating efforts in crisis managements operations. NATO must focus the transatlantic engagement on two regions: Central Asia and Middle East.

To sum up, the essay has recognized important steps taken by the NATO after 11-S. The long transition has not paralysed the whole organization as the UN Security Council did many years ago. In turn, NATO responds taking action in many areas and paradoxically raises questions about the legitimacy of the whole structure. Naturally, these necessary steps towards the future were optimal but not perfect. Modifications suit with new scenarios and threats but lacks of consistence among Members. A growing range of operations are healthy in many cases but not enough to achieve a vigorous political willingness and consesus among Members governments.

The key point of our conclusion is that NATO is alive and enjoys a great perspective for the future. Transitions are transitions because adaptation challenges the roots and historical behaviour. However, this kind of transition does not imply reinventing the entire Alliance and erase what has to do with its history, relevance and influence. NATO should keep on working in this line matching new instruments and elements (as presented in this paper) in order to develop a flexible model of regional collective security, restore the force of the International Law and integrate, into the system, the Asian powers. As Manfred Worner had forecasted thirteen years ago to the international community: *"NATO offers the only institutionalized basis for uniting the efforts of Europe and North America in dealing with the security challenges of this more complex and fragmenting world. NATO cannot be regarded as an instrument or as a military sub-contractor to the UN. This is why it is so important to develop a true partnership and a more structured relationship between the two organizations. If the strategic alliance of the world's two major power centres were to come apart, how could we hope acting separately to deal with the threats posed by weapons proliferation, mass migration and regional aggressors?"*.²⁴

²⁴ See the complete text/version on: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1993/s931007a.htm>